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SUBJECTS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE:
NOT REALLY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
DANIEL P. SULLIVAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
The collective bargaining statutes1 covering public employees require
the public employer to bargain2 with a representative of his employees
about wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. These
subjects of collective bargaining have received considerable attention in
the private sector,3 but their definition remains vague and ambiguous.4 Since
the public employee collective bargaining relationship is relatively new,5
it is not surprising that the uncertainty which exists in the private sector
also pervades the public sector." However, unlike the private sector, in the
public sector the meaning of the words "wages" and "hours" is not even
clear.7 It is the purpose of this article to resolve this ambiguity in the
public sector, and to propose a more workable definition of them. This
will be done by analyzing the specific statutory and judicial requirements
regulating public officials and employees, the public employee collective
bargaining statutes, and the case law.
*A.B., Western Michigan University, 1960; LL.B., Indiana University, 1963;
LL.M., Wayne State University, 1965.
1. E.g., CONN., Pub. A. No. 159 (1965); Micn. COMp. LAws, Pub. A. 379
(1965).
2. E.g., CONN., Pub. A. No. 159 (1965), § 3:
The municipal employer and such employee organization as has been
designated as exclusive representative of employees in an appropriate
unit, through appropriate officials or their representatives, shall have the
duty to bargain collectively ....
3. B.N.A., Scope of LM.R.A. Duty to Bargain, L.R.R. Rpt., L.RX. 58a-
64b (1967).
4. For example, until recently it was uncertain whether subcontracting was
a mandatory subject of collective bargaining, Fiberboard Paper Products v.
N.L.R.B., 57 L.R.R.M. 2609 (U.S. S.Ct. 1964).
5. The first significant step was taken in 1954 with the issuance of an
interim executive order by the Mayor of New York City. It provided for collective
bargaining in public employment. Interim Executive Order 49 of the Mayor of
New York City (1954).
6. In the private sector a considerable amount of experience has been
accumulated from which the public sector can derive some direction.
7. This point will be more fully developed later in this article.
(409)
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II. SUBjECrs oF BARGAINING
A. Wages
In the private sector of collective bargaining, the employer and the
employees' representative bargain over wages.8 The employer may or may
not choose to grant a wage increase. If he does not, the union may strike to
force him to increase wages. 9 If a strike occurs and is successful he may
choose to go out of business' ° rather than grant a wage increase.
In the public sector, the public employer also engages in collective
bargaining about wages with his employees' representative,,' But the sim-
ilarity ends here. If the public employer wants to grant an increase, he
must first ascertain whether funds have been appropriated' 2 for such an
increase. That is, he must look to a higher authority, while in the private
sector the employer is the final authority. If the public employer does not
grant an increase, the public employees may not strike.13 Also the public
employer may not decide to go out of business before granting a wage in-
crease to public employees who have unlawfully struck.
Truly, the dissimilarities between the public and private sector collec-
tive bargaining relationships regarding wages are significant. In fact the re-
quirement that the public employers must bargain about wages is almost
meaningless in view of the above mentioned circumstances.
However, in practice, public employees do make wage demands
backed up by strikes. The public employer makes concessions becalise of
this pressure, finding the money to meet the demands, and continues to
function. 14
8. E.g., CONN., Pub. A. No. 159 (1965), § 4-c.
9. "Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be
construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the
right to strike. . . ." National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 457 (1935); 29 U.S.C.
§ 163 (1964), as amended.
10. N.L.R.B. v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., Inc., 60 L.R.R.M. 2033 (3rd
Cir. 1965), held that the decision to close involved a management decision to
recommit and reinvest funds in the business. Therefore bargaining is not required
since such management decisions lie at the core of enterpreneurial control.
11. Sullivan, Binding Arbitration in Public Employment Labor Disputes, 36
CimN. L. REv. 666 (1967). See also, for a full discussion of collective bargaining
in the public service about wages and the wage increase criteria that has evolved
in Wisconsin, STERN, KRINCKY, & TENEI, FACTFINDING UNDER WISCONSIN LAw,
Univ. of Wisc., Madison, Wisc. (1966), pp. 15-17, 20-24. •
12. U.S. CONST., art. 1 § 9: "No money shall be drawn from the treasury,
but in consequence of appropriations made by law."
13. Sullivan, How Can The Problem Of The Public Employees Strike Be Re-
solved?, 19 OKLA. L. REv. 365, 380 (1966), n. 76; of., Bureau of Lab. Statistics,
Analyses of Work Stoppages, 1960,.1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, BULL. Nos. 1302, 1339,
1420, 1460 U.S. DEPT. OF LAB. (1966).
14. The most striking example of this occurred in January of 1966. Agreement
could not be reached as to the amount of a wage increase to be given the New
[Vol. 33
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While the power over appropriations remains with the legislature, its
power is diluted if action is forced by a strike. We must conclude that
although at first glance the public employee collective bargaining statutes
convey the opposite impression,' 5 wages are generally a legislative matter
rather than a matter subject to collective bargaining.
B. Hours
The public employer is required to bargain collectively about the
hours that his employees work. 16 In the private sector, the number of hours
that an employee must work may vary with the will of the parties at the
bargaining tabl.e. 1T There is less freedom in the public sector.. 8 While
most of the States' wage and hour laws exclude -public employees, 19 only
recently the Fair Labor Standards Act was amended to include certain
public employees.20 This creates a conflict between the express words of
this act and the States' public employee collective bargaining statutes.
21
This apparent conflict is resolved when considered in light of the experi-
ence accumulated in the private sector. Here the employer and employees'
representative have a legal duty to bargain under similar wage and hour
laws.22 For example, the parties could agree to a twenty hour work week
without violating this law. The wage and hour law recently enacted by
York Transit Authority Employees. These employees struck for two weeks. The
Authority granted an increase larger than it desired to, and as a result, it was
reported that:
Nowhere on New York's fiscal front is the situation bleaker than in
transit. The strike settlement of last January worsened an already worri-
some operating deficit. The loss is now expected to exceed $50 million by
July 1, and in the next fiscal year to be $115 million .... The promise
"cure" for this emergency was born in politics. . . . In mid-January, Gov-
ernor Rockefeller rushed in with an offer to aid .... The Governor man-
aged to bludgeon a reluctant Legislature into "advancing" $100 million.
N.Y. Times, April 4, 1966, p. 30, col. 2.
15. E.g., CONN., Pub. A. No. 159 (1965), §§ 3, 4-c.
16. E.g., CONN., Pub. A. No. 159 (1965), § 4-c.
17. The only significant limiting factor being the Fair Labor Standards Act,
52 Stat. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1965). *
18. This point is elaborated on later in this article.
19. E.g., see ALAsKA STAT. ANN., § 23.10.055(5) (1959); DEL., Pub. A., Ch.
18, L. (1965), § 901(e) (4); NEB., Pub. A. No. 35, L. (1967), § 2(3)(d); N.Y.,
Pub. A., Ch. 619, L. (1960), as amended by Ch. 649, L. (1966), § 651-5(n).
20. 80 Stat. 830 (1966), 29 U.S.C.A. § 203(d) (1968 Supp.):
Employer includes ... (employees of a State or a political subdivision
thereof employed (1) in a hospital, institute, or school referred to in the
last sentence of subsection (r) of this section, or (2) in the operation of a
railway or carrier referred to in such sentence) ....
21. E.g., CONN., Pub. A. No. 159 (1965), §§ 3, 4-c; Micn. COMP. LAws, Pub.
A. 379 (1965), § 15.
22. Note 17, supra.
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Congress does not cover a broad spectrum of public employees.23 These
employees are regulated by other statutes24 which preclude or-limit collec-
tive bargaining with regard to this subject.2 The public employer is not
given the duty to set the number of hours in a work week, his job is
simply to enforce the legislature's decision as to how many hours are to
be worked.26 If this is the situation, there appears to be room for bargain-
ing. On the other hand, if the legislature imposes on the public employer
the duty to set the hours that a public employee must work, duty would
appear to preclude bilateral action.27
To allow public employers and public employees' representatives the
exclusive power over determining how many hours the employees must
work apparently does not conflict with any policy considerations. There-
fore this might be an appropriate mandatory subject of collective bargain-
ing over which the parties have full power to make binding agreements.
Surely, this is a clearer case than the one involving wages, and certain
terms and conditions of employment.
C. Terms and Conditions of Employment
Terms and conditions of employment, unlike wages and hours, are,
words which in themselves have no clear meaning.28 As applied to the labor
relationship, this lack of a clear definition is compounded by uncertainty as.
to how the terms are to be used.29 Nevertheless, the public employer is re-.
quired to bargain about terms and conditions of employment.30 A conflict-
arises when the public employer is required by one statute to do an act-
unilaterally,8 ' and required by another statute to bargain collectively-
about the same subject.8 2 If the public employer refuses to bargain about-
23. Those not mentioned in the exception in Note 20, supra.
24. E.g., Wisc. STAT. ANN., State Officers, § 14.59 (2) (1957).
25. In Wisconsin, the statute states: "The standard basis of employment for-
the state service shall be 40 hours per week divided into 5 days of 8 .hours
each . . . " Wisc. STAT. ANN., State Officers, § 14.59 (2) (1957).
26. Wisc. STAT. ANN., State Officers, § 14.59 (2) (1957).
27. Here the duty would be clear, and to allow another party to aid in the-
decision-making would be a breach of the duty.
28. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DIcrIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE (Col-
lege Edition 1951), pp. 1503, 305, where the definitions of these words may be-
found.
29. Note 4, supra.
30. E.g., CONN., Pub. A. No. 159 (1965), §§ 3, 4-c.
31. MicH. STAT. ANN., § 5.193 (5) (1965 Supp.), "The civil service commis-
sion shall provide by regulation for the hours, and conditions of service, . . . in.
the township service' . ... ))
32. MicH. COMP. LAWS, Pub. A. 379 (1965), § 15, (hours and other terms,
and conditions of employment are a subject of bargaining). The Michigan col-
lective bargaining statute for public employees also conflicts with the Michigan
Teaching Act where holidays, tenure, sabatticals, school term, course, and text--
[Vol. 33
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this subject he may be held to have committed an unfair labor practice.p
The board may order him to bargain," and this order may be enforced
by a court.3 5 It is true that an employer need not make concessions on
this matter,30 and may still make a unilateral decision. On the other hand,
if the experience in the private sector is an indicator he must give a little
ground on a subject he must bargain about.3t When this occurs, he clearly
violates the statute requiring him to perform the act unilaterally.
The dilution of the legislative power over wages marks a basic change
in our system of government. If the legislature were to give up control
over certain other subjects that it now controls with specific legislation,
i.e., terms and conditions of employment, no fundamental change in our
governmental structure would take place. Therefore, collective bargaining
about some of these subjects would seem to be in order in certain situations.
Where civil service is concerned, the matter is further complicated.
Under this legislation,38 the legislature is attempting to regulate matters of
particular concern as it has done with separate legislation, 9 and it is attempt-
ing to cure the evils of the spoils system.40
books are established by statute, MIcH. STAT. ANN., §§ 15.3368, 15.3569, 15.3572,
15.3575, 15.3583, 15.3882, 15.3887 (1959). Note also the conflict in the Wisconsin
laws: WIsc. STAT. ANN., Civ. Serv., § 16.10 (3) (1957).
No person shall be appointed, transferred, removed, reinstated, promoted,
or reduced as officer, clerk, employee or laborer in the classified serv-
ice ... by any means, other than those predescribed in sections 16.01 to
16.30.
Wisc. STAT. ANN., §§ 111.81 (2), 111.84 (d) (1966), "It shall be a prohibited
practice for a state employer . . . : to refuse to bargain collectively . . . ," (con-
cerning terms and conditions of employment); A violation of the civil service act
is a misdemeanor, Wisc. STAT. ANN., Civ. Serv., §§ 16.302 (1967 Supp.).
33. Micn. CoMP. LAWS, Pub. A. 379 (1965), §§ 10-e, 15.
34. Micn. CoMP. LAWS, Pub. A. 379 (1965), §§ 16-(b).
35. Micn. CoMP. LAWS, Pub. A. 379 (1965), §§ 16-(d).
36. Mica. CoMP. LAWS, Pub. A. 379 (1965), § 15.
37. E.g., it was pointed out in the Congressional hearings on the Labor
Management Relations Act that:
Last year, a Company offered to the union one of the largest raises ever
granted in its industry. The offer was the most generous one then being
discussed in the industry. However, it fell five cents short of meeting the
union's demand. The Union wished to bargain about the employer's esti-
mated and prospective profits. Notwithstanding the very intense "bargain-
ing" that had gone on, the Board accused the Company of "refusing to
bargain." These cases show that unless Congress writes into the law
guides for the Board to follow, the Board may attempt to carry this
process still further and seek to control more and more the terms of Col-
lective Bargaining Agreements. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Acr, 1947,
U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash., D. C. (1948), pp. 310, 311, 312.
38. Mici. CoMP. LAws, Pub. A. 246 (1965).
39. E.g., the minimum wage for policemen and firemen, provisions for their
removal, and pensions are regulated by statute in New York. N.Y. STAT. ANN.,
Uncon. Laws, § 861 (1923).
40. Hanley v. Murphy, 40 Cal.2d 572, 255 P.2d 1 (1953).
1968]
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Perhaps it is an open question at this stage whether collective bargain-
ing reintroduces a similar evil. Yet there is a conflict with the merit system
where an individual is promoted on the basis of seniority rather than
merit.41 Promotion on the basis of seniority is a typical subject for collective
bargaining.42
Another conflict occurs when a union demands preferential hiring for
union members. 43 This precludes any consideration of merit, and obstructs
and evades the primary purpose of the legislation dealing with civil service.44
The policy considerations apparently favor civil service statutes over
public employee collective bargaining statutes. Therefore those subjects
that clearly conflict with the basic policy of the former statutes should be
precluded from consideration at the bargaining table.4 5 However, where this
conflict does not exist, those subjects should not be removed from bargain-
ing.40
Terms and conditions of employment as subjects of collective bargain-
ing have a broad range of meaning.47 Many of these terms and conditions
are found in collective bargaining agreements in the public sector.48 In fact
some subjects included in these contracts are beyond the scope of collective
bargaining.40 Yet if no one challenges these provisions, they too as a matter
of practice, become subjects of collective bargaining. This can occur by
design or because of the lack of expertise5" prevailing in this area of labor
41. In the transit field merit may be only a secondary consideration when an
employee refused to join a union. California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957).
42. Teamsters, Local 553 v. N.L.R.B., 366 U.S. 763 (1961).
43. California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957).
44. Note 40, swpra.
45. There are other ways of alleviating hardships.
46. Providing of course that other statutory policy considerations are not
outweighed.
47. FoRKosca, A TREATISE ON LABOR LAW (1965), p. 855.
48. E.g., in the State of Michigan, as of September of 1967, forty-six cities
have signed written agreements with one or more groups of municipal employees.
The total number of signed labor agreements exceed sixty. Fifty-six of the agree-
ments call for dues checkoff. Twelve cities have agreed to a union shop provision,
and three cities have agreed to an agency shop clause. Letter received from the
Manager of the Personnel & Services Division of the Michigan Municipal League
in Ann Arbor, Michigan, dated November 7, 1967.
49. E.g., binding arbitration provisions found in public sector collective bar-
gaining agreements, letter received from the Manager of the Personnel & Services
Division of the Michigan Municipal League in Ann Arbor, Michigan, dated No-
vember 7, 1967, are not legal, Mich. Atty. Gen. Opin. No. 4578 (May 26, 1967);
cf., Re Oakland Cty, Sheriff's Dept., et al. and A.F.S.C.M.E., M.L.M.B. iCase
No. c 66 F-63, 1968 State of Mich. Lab. Opin. 1 '(Jan. 8, 1968).
50. This may be caused by the newness of the relationship. Note 5, suipra.
It is questionable whether the Board has such expertise, N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publi-
cations, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944). If it does not, the public employer who becomes
involved in collective bargaining once a year certainly does not.
[Vol. 33
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relations. Nevertheless, the legislative policies that place: restrictions on
these subjects of collective bargaining are merely dormant, and the subjects
as a matter of law are limited.
III. A PECULIARITY IN MICHIGAN
In 1965, the State of Michigan enacted a statute providing that a town-
ship board may pass a resolution adopting the civil service system set out
in the same statute.51 After this resolution is passed, 52 the township electorate
must also approve it. s Such a resolution was passed and approved in the
township of Redford in August of 1966. " In the same general session the
Michigan legislature enacted a public employment relations act 5 This
act requires the public employer to bargain collectively about wages, hours,
and other terms or conditions of employment.56 However under the adopted
civil service act,57 the civil service commission is duty bound to set the
working hours and service requirements for vacations, sick leaves, and other
matters in the township service 58
In April of 1967, a labor organization representing employees of Red-
ford Township brought a charge against Redford Township. It alleged that
the township refused to bargain.5 9 A complaint was issued by the Board on
May 1, 1967.60 The township board answered that it could not bargain with
the labor organization because all subjects of collective bargaining were
controlled by the civil service commission of the township.6' The trial
examiner held that the civil service commission had complete control over
the subjects about which collective bargaining was to take place. Therefore
the township of Redford was not required to bargain, but the civil service
commission was. 62 The Michigan Labor Mediation Board affirmed this
decision without comment.6 3
In this case the Board replaced, by interpretation, the township with
the civil service commission as the sole arbitor over all matters relating to
51. MicH. STAT. ANN., § 5.193 (1) (1965).
52. MicH. STAT. ANN., § 5.193 (1) (1965).
53. Micr. STAT. ANN., § 5.193 (1) (1965).
54. Township of Redford and Michigan Conference of Teamsters, M.L.M.B.
Case No. C 67 D-32, 1967 State of Mich. Lab. Opin. 221 (Sept. 21, 1967).
55. MicH. COMP. LAws, Pub. A. 379 (1965).
56. Mica. COMP. LAws, Pub. A. 379 (1965), § 15.
57. MiCH. STAT. ANN., § 5.193 (1) (1965).
58. Mic. STAT. ANN., § 5.193 (5) (1965 Supp.).
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control over township public employees. If the legislature had intended to
make such a radical change in representative government, it would have
done so expressly. The legislature did expressly leave in the township board
the following power:
The classification and standardization of salaries shall not be final
until approved by the township board, and salaries shall not be
paid except in accordance with the classification and standardiza-
tion. 4
Salaries, hence, are within the ultimate control of the township's Board of
Supervisors. Yet, the township was not ordered to bargain about them.
The civil service act imposed limitations on the township's power over
certain subjects of collective bargaining.65 These subjects were put under
the jurisdiction of a civil service commission to increase efficiency in the
public service by basing any change on merit. The Michigan Labor Media-
tion Board should have concluded that collective bargaining over these sub-
jects might undermine this purpose. An example would be hiring on the
basis of union membership where the employee's qualifications are only of
secondary importance. 6
This decision treats the civil service commission of Redford Township
as a public employer. This is inaccurate and unfortunate. These employees
are really employed by certain agencies and departments of the Redford
Township Board of Supervisors. These agencies and departments, like the
Board of Supervisors, are the public employers referred to in the Act. The
civil service commission merely establishes certain standards that the em-
ployees of the township must meet as a whole in order to insure efficiency
in the township's governmental services. Surely, each agency and depart-
ment, as well as the township Board of Supervisors, must make its own
adaptation of the civil service rules to meet its own individual needs. It is in
these areas that collective bargaining could take place. Collective bargaining
should take place with the individual public employers.
In this case, the conflicting provisions of a civil service statute 7 and
a public employee collective bargaining statute 8 were resolved improperly.
If such reasoning were used in the private sector we might conclude that
since wages and hours of employment under the Fair Labor Standards Act0 9
64. MICH. STAT. ANN., § 5.193 (8) (1965 Supp.).
65. MIcH. STAT. ANN., § 5.193 (1) et seq. (1965).
66. Notes 41, 42 supra.
67. MIcH. STAT. ANN., § 5.193 (1) et seq. (1965).
68. MICH. CoMP. LAws, Pub. A. 379 (1965).
69. 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1965).
[Vol. 33
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are administered by a public officer,70 this officer is the person the employees'
representatives should bargain with rather than employers. This is because
he resolves questions concerning wages and hours which bind employers
within certain limits. 71 This agency regulates the private employee's labor
relationship as the civil service commission in Redford Township regulates
the relationship of public employees. The only difference is that'the com-
mission has the rule making power to regulate on broader matters. For
example, it can set hours of employment. 72 To require bargaining with
agencies such as these takes away from the parties who are most familiar
with the relationship, the immediate employer and his employees, the col-
lective bargaining tool which would make resolution of their difficulties
possible.
IV. CLASSIFICATION OF SUBJECTS
In the private sector of employment, the courts have set up three
classifications into which the subjects of collective bargaining fall: manda-
tory, permissive, and illegal.73 Mandatory subjects must be bargained about
in good faith. Either party commits an unfair labor practice if he refuses
to bargain about a mandatory subject,74 and may be ordered to bargain
about this subject. 75 The parties may bargain about permissive subjects if
both are willing. Either party may refuse to bargain about such subjects. 70
Illegal subjects of collective bargain may not be bargained about. If these
subjects are bargained about, the parties are said to have committed an
illegal act.77
In the area of public employment the limitation on the discussion of
illegal subjects clearly applies as it does in the private sector.78 While there
70. 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 3-m (1965).
71. 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 10 (1965).
72. Mica. STAT. ANN., § 5.193 (5) (1965 Supp.),"... The civil service com-
mission shall provide by regulation for the hours. . .. "
73. N.L.R.B. v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
74. Id. at 347.
75. Id. at 348.
76. Id. at 344.
77. Id. at 346.
78. E.g., agreements to let an arbitrator settle public sector labor disputes by
a binding decision, Mich. Atty. Gen. Opin. No. 4578 (May 26, 1967); Hours of
labor in excess of those provided by law, and permitting working conditions
prohibited by law, LA. REv. STAT. ANN., § 23:890 (B) (1964); making a contract
for more than one year, Wyo., Pub. A., Ch. 197, L. (1965), § 27-268; making a
contract for more than three years, R. I. GEN. LAws, § 28-9.3-4 (1966); preroga-
tives of: promotion, layoff, position classification, compensation, fringe benefits,
examinations, discipline, merit salary determination policy, and other actions.
provided for by law and rules governing civil service, Wisc. STAT. ANN., § 111.91
1968]
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are many limitations on the discussion of permissive subjects of collective
bargaining in the public sector, there is a close analogy to the private sector's
treatment of this classification.7 9 It is here suggested that mandatory
subjects of collective bargaining is an inappropriate classification in the
public sector. The government may, but is not required to discuss a sub-
ject.80 Therefore, the analogy to the private sector's experience is of no
help."' The statutes8 2 creating the right in public employees to bargain
(2) (1965); determining whether to reduce a collective bargaining agreement to
writing in the form of an ordinance, resolution, or agreement, Mulcahy, A Munici-
pality's Rights and Responsibilities Under The Wisconsin Municipal Labor Law,
49 MARQ. L. REv. 512, 515 (1966), note 5.
79. Recently, it was suggested that the following might be permissive subjects
for consultation under Executive Order 10988, 27 Fed. Reg. 551 (1962):
A. Policy on Grievances and Internal Agency Appeals: Development and
operation of grievance and appeals systems; B. Policy on the Work En-
vironment: light, heat, ventilation, cleanliness and sanitation, and safety
practices and equipment; C. Policy on Design and Scheduling of Work:
Assignment of work is a management prerogative, but this does not pre-
clude consultation on: tours of duty, rotation assignments, joint employee-
management cooperation committees, meal periods, and vacation sched-
uling; D. Policy on Career Policies and Procedures: Promotion plans
(coverage, methods, etc.), opportunities for career mobility (reassignment,
detail procedures, etc.), opportunities for training, apprenticeship, reduc-
tion-in-force procedures, and disciplinary practices and procedures; E.
Policy on Employee Benefits and Services: Lunch rooms, snack bars, coffee
breaks, banking, check-cashing services, provision or use of recreation
facilities, and transportation and parking arrangements; F. Policy on Pay:
Where law permits, the implementation of pay policies may be subject
to consultation. For example, the prevailing rate wage policy is a matter
of law, but such matters as participation in periodic wage surveys are not
necessarily fixed. Similarly, implementation of other types of pay policy
may be discussed, such as overtime, call back, and differential pay, par-
ticularly with respect to how opportunities to earn such special types of
pay are granted; G. Policy on Services to Employee Organizations:
Bulletin boards, use of intra-office distribution system, official newspapers,
and on-site meeting facilities. U.S. Civ. Serv. Comm., Sectional Analysis
of Executive Order 1098&, L.R.R. RPT., L.R.X. 4437, 4441-2 (April 24,
1962).
See also, Mulcahy, A Municipality's Rights and Responsibilities Under the Wis-
consin Municipal Labor Law, 49 MARg. L. Rav. 512, 514 (1966), note 3(4).
80. The governments own laws determine which subjects are bargainable.
See, Munic. Employer v. Neff, 64 L.R.R.M. 2627 (Ore. 1965).
81. If the legislature has the power to appropriate government monies, Micr.
CoNsT. of 1963, art. IV § 30, 31, how can it be said that a public employer below
the level of the legislature has the power to enter into binding collective bargaining
agreements which could call for expenditures of money not as yet appropriated,
MicH. CoMp. LAws, Pub. A. 379 (1965), § 15. But even a statutory repeal would
not apply in the face of a constitutional provision such as the one in Massachusetts.
It follows a provision creating the power in a public employer to bargain collec-
tively on wages, salaries, hours, health benefits, pensions, and retirement allow-
ances:
The provisions of general or special laws relative to rates of wages, hours
of employment and working conditions of public employees and relating
[Vol. 33
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collectively about wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment apparently mean something different than the similarly worded re-
quirement in the private sector statute.s 3 For example, since the.legislature
must appropriate money to pay the wages of state employees, a.department
head cannot bargain about those wages if they have not been appropriated. 4
If he should refuse to bargain about this subject, it would seem reasonable
to say that he did not commit an unfair labor practice for refusing to do
something that he did not have the full power to do. Therefore unless the
legislature specifically delegated its power, no subject in the public employ-
ment labor relations sector would fall within the mandatory classification.
Legislative functions can be delegated, 5 but the delegation may be with-
drawn at any time. Since all governmental powers cannot be spelled out to
the last word, a certain amount of discretion exists within those powers
to contracts for public works, shall not apply to the authority nor to the
employees thereof, nor to employees of contractors with the authority
but the authority and its employees shall be governed with respect to hours
of employment, rates of wages, salaries, hours, working conditions, health
benefits, pensions, and retirement allowances of its employees and with
respect to contracts for construction, maintenance and repair by the laws
relating to street railway companies. MAss. ANN. LAws, Ch. 161A, § 19
(1964).
82. E.g., CONN., Pub. A. No. 159 (1965), §§ 3, 4-c; MicH. COMP. LAWS,
Pub. A. 379 (1965) § 15. A more sensible section might be added on to this re-
quirement, to read:
In the event that any part or provision of any such agreement is in
conflict with any law, ordinance or by-law, such law, ordinance or by-law
shall prevail so long as such conflict remains. If funds are necessary to
implement such written agreement, a request for the necessary appropria-
tion shall be submitted to the legislative body. If such request is rejected,
the matter shall be returned to the parties for further bargaining
MAss. Pub. A., Ch. 763 (1965), § 178L.
83. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 8-(d). Certainly a school board may not
surrender control of educational policies to teachers by contract. A county road
commission, by contract, may not surrender control of selection of road projects
to its employees. A city may not surrender the choice of the areas to be protected
to firemen. A Lapeer County, Michigan Circuit Court has this to say on the
matter:
The contract with which we are concerned goes full range. It, by its terms,
requires participation in all programs within certain categories without
regard to cost or local need. I am unable to find from the language of the
statute, or otherwise, a legislative intent to make such a sweeping altera-
tion in the structure of government. Rather, it is my opinion that the
legislature intended to authorize collective bargaining with public em-
ployees with respect to working conditions within the framework of
policies and projects selected, from time to time, by duly elected officials,
the contract provision is invalid.
Lapeer Cty. School Bd. v. Teachers Union, Case No. 345680 (Cir. Ct., Lapeer Cty.,
Jan. 3, 1967).
84. Note 83, supra.
85. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 31 (1959).
1968]
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delegated to a subordinate of the legislature.86 However, the discretionary
power of the subordinate cannot be expanded to the point where the
legislatively delegated power is considered to be only secondary to the
discretionary power that springs from this delegated power.
Even though the above analysis may be correct as a matter of principle,
in practice a Wisconsin Circuit Court has accepted the mandatory classifica-
tion by holding that the school calendar is a compulsorily negotiable subject
of collective bargaining to the extent that it affects wages, hours, and con-
ditions of employment.8 7
The use of the classifications of mandatory, permissive, and illegal
terms in the public sector apparently encounters the same difficulty as the
use of the words wages, hours, and conditions of employment. This is be-
cause collective bargaining in the public sector is only as workable as elected
officials want it to be.88 In the private sector, sometimes the employer
does not have a choice.89
V. TENNESSEE VALLEY AuThoRITY
In 1933 the Tennessee Valley Authority was established by Congress."
It was set up for agricultural and industrial development, to improve navi-
86. San Antonio v. Zogheib, 70 S.W.2d 333, 334 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
87. School Board v. W.E.R.B., 65 L.R.R.M. 2488 (Wisc. Cir. Ct. 1965); see
also a decision by a trial examiner of the Michigan Labor Mediation Board
which held that the following subjects were mandatory subjects of collective bar-
gaining:
Request for information that the union may need during negotiations
and/or enforcement of the contract; Compensated release time for any
teacher on any committee, agency, or other body established by the
employer; The right of the union to have a regular staff member visit
schools to investigate teacher conditions or teachers' problems; The right
of the union to appear on the school board agenda; The right of the
teachers to appeal discharge or demotions to the board of education;
The right of the teachers to evaluate curriculum and class schedule; Size
of classes; Selection of textbooks materials; Supplies; Planning of facilities
and special education; Establishment of in-service training of teachers;
Procedures for the rating of effectiveness of teachers; The establishment
of self-sustaining summer school programs for remedial purposes; and
Severance pay.
Re N. Dearborn Heights School Dist., and Loc. 1439, N. Dearborn Heights Fed.
of Teachers, and M.F.T., M.L.M.B. Case No. C-66 E-46, 1966 State of Mich.
Opin. 434 (Nov. 1, 1966); The agency shop is also a mandatory subject of col-
lective -bargaining, Re Oakland Cty. Sheriff's Dept., et al. and A.F.S.C.M.E.,
M.L.M.B. Case No. C 66 F-63, 1968 State of Mich. Lab. Opin, 1 (Jan. 8, 1968);
and checkoff must be bargained about, Sanilac Cty. Rd. Comm. & Teamsters
Local 1339, 165 G.E.R.R. B-1 (M.L.M.B. 11-8-66).
88. U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 2, cl. 1.
89. He lacks a realistic choice when the employees have sufficient power to
force him out of business.
90. 48 Stat. 58 (1933), 16 U.S.C.A. 831 et seq. (1960).
(Vol. 35
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gation in the Tennessee River, and to control the destructive flood waters
in the Tennessee River and Mississippi River Basins 1 T.V.A. presently
has approximately 17,000 employees. 92 These employees are for all intents
and purposes not covered by civil service laws 3 The Authority has the
power of eminent domain,9 4 and the power to sell bonds to finance future
construction. 5 The statute requires that the prevailing wage be paid the
employees of the Authority. 6 In addition to selling bonds, other sources
of revenue are the sale of fertilizer 97 and electricity.98 If these sums are not
sufficient to run the Authority, all appropriations necessary to carry out the
provisions of the Act are authorized 9
The Authority is autonomous with respect to almost all areas of labor
relations. When operating on a self sustaining basis its determination as
to the prevailing wage is not reviewable by Congress. 0  Because of the
91. 48 Stat. 58 (1933), 16 U.S.C.A. 831 (1960).
92. Massey, Labor-Management Cooperation In T.V.A., 1965 Pub. Personnel
Rev. 130, 131 (July, 1965).
93. 48 Stat. 58 (1933), 16 U.S.C.A. 831(b) (1960).
94. 48 Stat. 58 (1933), 16 U.S.C.A. 831(b) (1960).
95. 48 Stat. 58 (1933), 16 U.S.CA. 831(b) (1960).
96. 48 Stat. 58 (1933), 16 U.S.C.A. 831(b) (1960). The following gives some
idea of the various wage comparison standards that could be used. These are cited
by the factfinder under the Wisconsin Municipal Employees Collective Bargaining
Law, Wisc. STAT. ANN., § 111.70(4)(D) (1962):
1. The absolute amount of increase granted to employees doing the same
work in a neighboring municipality; 2. The absolute amount of increase
granted to employees doing similar work in private industry in the same
community; 3. The present wage compared with average wages (existing
wages, rather than wage increases) paid to workers of comparable ex-
perience doing comparable work in other cities; 4. The increase requested
as opposed to that given to other employees of the same unit of govern-
ment who are not in the collective bargaining unit; 5. The existing wage
as against that paid for similar work in the same geogeaphic area by
different units of government (city, county, state, and federal); 6. Present
take-home pay contrasted with former take-home pay when working
longer hours.
Additional comparison that did not require the same reliance on statistics in-
cluded: A. "Social usefulness (of deputy sheriffs) when compared with other
workers (teachers) .. . receiving higher wages."; B. "Without creating morale
problems, the county cannot offer to a boy just out of high school a wage in
excess of that offered a teacher who is a college graduate."; C. The similarity of
the wage increase granted to the amount "to which free collective bargaining
would have carried the parties absent the interference of a third party."; D.
Whether the wage increase requested would put the workers "in an unrealistically
high income category as compared to other townspeople."; E. Whether "relation-
ships which had existed in prior years" will be disturbed if no increase is given,"
STERN, KRINSKY, & TENER, FACTFINDING UNDER WISCONSIN LAw, p. 16 (1966).
97. 48 Stat. 58 (1933), 16 U.S.C.A. 831(d) (1960).
98. 48 Stat. 58 (1933), 16 U.S.C.A. 831(i) (1960).
99. 48 Stat. 58 (1933), 16 U.S.C.A. 831(z) (1960).
100. There is no provision in the Tennessee Valley Authority Act stating that
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T.V.A.'s autonomous powers, the scope of its power is even greater than in
those bodies that have had their scope of power specifically set up by
legislation.""' Because of this power the analogy between private and public
employment is more appropriate. 10 2 Here the delegation of legislative au-
thority is constitutional because of the necessity of the situation.10 3 There
was no other practical way to cope with the problem. Congress set up a
body that, if financially successful, was answerable to no one.
VI. THE PUBLIC TRANSIT EXCEPTION
The most significant exception to the limitations noted above on what
subjects are bargainable in the public sector is the publicly owned transit
system exception. 0 4 Questions of unlawful delegation of legislative authority
are overriden by the need for uniformity throughout the states to make
such a system work. 0 5 Ten years ago the Supreme Court of the United
States rendered a decision dealing with this situation. 06
In 1942, a labor organization representing employees of the Belt Rail-
road asserted that the State in conducting this facility came under the
jurisdiction of the National Railroad Adjustment Board 0 7 set up by the
Railway Labor Act. 08 The railroad was owned and operated by the State of
California as a part of the facilities of the San Francisco Harbor. The Union
asserted that, being under this Act, the State was required to bargain col-
lectively'00 and to reduce any agreement to writing. As a result, an agree-
ment was entered into and remained in effect until the suit of California v.
Taylor"0° was initiated.
In 1948, the Attorney General sought a declaratory judgment in a
California court to determine whether the San Francisco Harbor Board was
required to bargain collectively with the labor organization. In 1949 and
101. This is true since the Authority can determine what the prevailing wage
is and pay it if it has the funds. Other governmental bodies must wait for appro-
priations.
102. Since the Tennessee Valley Authority has so much independence from
legislative control, its labor relations policy is quite similar to the policy existing in
the private sector.
103. Cf. California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957).
104. This term could include intrastate railroads, California v. Taylor, 353 U.S.
553 (1957).
105. California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957).
106. Ibid.
107. 44 Stat. 577 (1926), 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1965).
108. 44 Stat. 577 (1926), 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1965).
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1951, the labor organization filed claims with the National Railroad Ad-
justment Board seeking to enforce the agreement entered into in 1942. The
Board withheld jurisdiction in these cases pending the outcome of the
declaratory judgment suit.'"
The trial court held that the state was subject to the Railway Labor
Act.112 The California District Court affirmed. 113 In 1951 the California
Supreme Court reversed and held the Act did not apply to the State of
California. 11 4 Certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court.2 5
On the basis of this case, the Board refused to hear the claims that were
filed.11 6
Employees covered by the collective bargaining agreement then brought
an action in the United States District Court to compel the Board to hear
the claims. The District Court held117 that the State was not covered by
the Railway Labor Act, but the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.'1"
It ordered the Board to take jurisdiction of the claims. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari." 9
The principal issues before the high court were whether it was the intent
of Congress to impliedly include the State under the Act, and if so whether
it was unconstitutional because of the eleventh amendment.120 The court
realized that there were a number of similar federal statutes12 ' that did
not expressly include the states which had been interpreted to include
them. 122 The Court held that since this act required uniform regulation in
order to prevent disputes in the railroad industry, states should be included
by implication. 23 The Court indicated that the eleventh amendment was
111. Petitioner's brief before the Supreme Court of the United States in
California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957), pp. 6-9.
112. California v. Taylor, 222 P.2d 27 (1950).
113. Ibid.
114. 37 Cal.2d 412, 232 P.2d 857 (1951).
115. 342 U.S. 876 (1951).
116. In Re Taylor, Case R. 11-12 (Nat'l. Railroad Adjustment Board 1952).
117. 132 F. Supp. 356 (D.C.N.D. Il1. 1955).
118. 233 F.2d 251 (7th Cir. 1956).
119. 352 U.S. 940 (1956).
120. Respondents brief before the Supreme Court of the United States in
California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957), p. 1.
121. E.g., 35 Stat. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.CA. §§ 51-60 (1954), (Federal Employee
Liability Act); 36 Stat. 913 (1911), 45 U.S.C.A. 22 (1962), (Federal Boiler Inspec-
tion Act); 27 Stat. 531 (1893), 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7 (1954), (The Safety Appliance
Act); 34 Stat. 1415 (1907), 40 U.S.C.A. §§ 321-325 (1962), (Federal Hours of
Service Act); 24 Stat. 379 (1887), 49 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1955), (Interstate Commerce
Act).
122. E.g., Ohio v. C.I.R., 292 U.S. 360 (1934); U.S. v. California, 297 U.S.
175 (1936); Ga. v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942).
123. The court did this by using the commerce clause, California v. Taylor,
353 U.S. 553, 568 (1957).
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subservient to the commerce clause in this case because of the necessity that
uniformity prevail in the railroad industry in order to prevent labor
disputes. 24
The case established that: 1) the California Civil Service Commission's
right to regulate the State's employer-employee relationship is limited; 25 2)
voluntary binding arbitration engaged in under the Railway Labor Act may
dispense state funds against the will of state officials;' 26 and 3) the State
of California may be required to hire only those people who are willing to
join a union after working for a short period of time.127
The result is that here wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment are bargainable subjects with the same meanings as used in
the private sector. The parties who bargain control the appropriating power
of the state legislature. A union security agreement can restrict the hiring
policies of the state.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is clear that collective bargaining in the public sector differs from
collective bargaining in the private sector. Taxing and appropriating powers
and the necessity for running government efficiently and continuously ex-
plains the difference. Consequently such classifications as mandatory and
permissive subjects of collective bargaining do not transcend the public-
private sector line.
Collective bargaining in the public sector is unique. In the final analysis
it is primarily a unilateral decision making process. The only exceptions
exist where money is amply appropriated and discretionary powers are broad.
The Tennessee Valley Authority falls into this category when it is
financially self-sustaining. This Authority was set up to meet an emergency.
Perhaps under normal circumstances such an arrangement would be im-
proper.
A second bargaining relationship in this category is the one in the
public transit systems. As with the Tennessee Valley Authority, a need was
created when private enterprise was unable to continue to run those systems
that were vital to the maintenance of commerce. The transit systems have
less autonomy, but have control over the legislature's appropriating power.
124. Ibid.
125. Id. at 560.
126. Id., at 559.
127. Id. at 567.
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It is doubtful whether this type of power should be extended to other gov-
ernmental bodies without a similar necessity.
A workable definition of wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment in the public sector must evolve around democratic repre-
sentative government. Wages are a legislative matter, and only bargainable
to a limited degree. Hours are only limited as a bargainable subject by basic
wage and hour law considerations. Terms and conditions of employment
include such a broad area that each demand must be considered separately.
If it is controlled by other law or discretionary power it must be decided
which basic purpose should prevail. If it is not controlled by other law or
discretionary power it must be decided whether bargaining is in the best
interest of the public. Therefore collective bargaining in public employment
with regard to hours and terms and conditions of employment should pro-
ceed on a case by case basis with public policy being the basic consideration.
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